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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal is from the grant and reaffirmation of Luke's Motion for
Summary Judgment on Quiet Title Claims. Luke made two arguments in support
of his motion (R. 1453-61); the McMurdie Parties made two primary arguments
in opposition (R. 1955-60); and the trial court granted the motion (R. 2722-43).
The McMurdie Parties then filed a rule 54(b) Motion to Revise. (R. 2745-56,
3038.) The McMurdie Parties made one primary argument in support of that
motion (R. 2750-55, 2998-3004); Luke made one primary argument in opposition

(R. 2979); and the trial court denied the motion, reaffirming its prior grant of
summary judgment in favor of Luke (R. 3036-41).
The parties' specific arguments in support of and opposition to those
motions, and the trial court's specific rulings on them, are as follows:
Luke's Arguments in Favor of Summary Judgment
Luke's First Argument

Luke first argued that the foreclosure in this case occurred outside the
applicable, six-year limitation period. (R. 1453-54.) Specifically, he argued that
the debt secured by the 2001 Trust Deed was the 2001 Note; that the maturity
date of the 2001 Note was March 24, 2003; that the statute of limitations for an
action under the 2001 Note thus expired on July 25, 2009; and that the foreclosure
proceedings did not commence until 2014, outside the limitation period. (Id.)
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Luke's Second Argument

Luke next argued that the 2001 Note was superseded by the 2004 Notes;
that, because the 2001 Note had been superseded, Zane's failure to make any
payments after March 18, 2004, was a breach of the 2004 Notes, not a breach of
the 2001 Note; and that, because only the 2001 Note was secured by the 2001
Trust Deed, foreclosure of the 2001 Trust Deed was not an appropriate remedy
for Zane's breach of the 2004 Notes and later agreements. (R. 1455-61.)
The McMurdie Parties' Arguments Opposing Summary Judgment
Tlie McMurdie Parties' Ffrst A1~gument

In response to Luke's statute of limitations argument, the McMurdie
Parties argued- under the heading "equitable discovery rule" - that Luke
should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations because the failure to
<@

initiate the foreclosure within the limitation period was due to Mr. McMurdie's
reasonable reliance on Zane's fraudulent conduct; that Mr. McMurdie did not
discover Zane's fraud until 2013; and that the foreclosure occurred within six
years of Mr. McMurdie's discovery of the fraud. (R. 1690-95, 1952-57.)
Tlie McMurdie Parties' Second Argument

In response to Luke's argument that the 2001 Note was superseded and
discharged by the 2004 Notes, the McMurdie Parties argued that the 2003 Note,
2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and 2013 Extension Agreements were

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

illegal contracts and that, as illegal contracts, none of them could serve to
supersede and discharge the 2001 Note. (R. 1957-60.)
The Trial Court's Bases for Granting Summary Judgment

The trial court ruled that the McMurdie Parties' foreclosure action was
initiated outside the six-year limitation period. (R. 2731-34, attached as
Addendum G to Br. of Appellants.) Specifically, it held (1) that the foreclosure
~

was initiated more than six years after Zane defaulted on the 2001 Note; (2) that
for the "equitable discovery rule" to apply, the defendant's fraud must have
prevented the plaintiff from discovering within the limitation period that he had
a claim; (3) that the McMurdie Parties knew within the limitation period that
they had a cause of action against Zane (even if they did not become aware of
Zane's fraud until later); and (4) that the "equitable discovery rule" could not,
therefore, be applied to estop Luke's reliance on the statute of limitations. (Id.)
As to whether the 2004 Notes superseded the 2001 Note, the trial court
held (1) that the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and 2013
Extension Agreements were voidable; (2) that the McMurdie Parties had elected
to void them; and (3) that, as a voided contracts, they could not supersede the
2001 Note. (R. 2734-35, attached as Addendum G to Br. of Appellants.) Because
those contracts were void, they also could not be used to change the statute of
limitations analysis. (See R. 2735, attached as Addendum G to Br. of Appellants.)

3
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The McMurdie Parties' Argument in Favor of their Motion to Revise

Less than two weeks after the trial court issued its decision granting
summary judgment to Luke, the McMurdie Parties filed a rule 54(b) Motion to
~

Revise, in which they presented an alternative argument in opposition to Luke's
Motion for Summary Judgment on Quiet Title Claims. (R. 2743, 2750-58, 29983004.) Specifically, rather than exercise their option to void the illegal 2003 Note,
2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and 2013 Extension Agreements, the
McMurdie Parties exercised their option to ratify those agreements. (See id.) They
then argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether those
agreements renewed and extended the 2001 Note or superseded and discharged
it. (See id.) If they renewed the 2001 Note, the foreclosure was within the six-year
limitation period. (See id.) If they did not, the foreclosure was outside the
limitation period and/ or the 2001 Note had been discharged and foreclosure was
improper in any event. (See id.)
The McMurdie Parties pointed the trial court to a body of evidence
suggesting that the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and 2013
Extension Agreements each renewed and extended the 2001 Note. (R. 2999-3004.)
They then argued that because, at a minimum, a material issue of fact existed as
to whether those subsequent documents renewed the 2001 Note, summary

~

judgment was improper. (R. 2756.)

4
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Luke's Argument in Opposition to the Motion to Revise
In response, Luke acknowledged that if the McMurdie Parties were
allowed to ratify the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and
2013 Extension Agreements, the trial court would "need to ... make a
determination [as to whether] the 2004 Notes superseded and replaced the 2001
Note." (R. 2979-80.) Luke then pointed the trial court to evidence suggesting that
the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and 2013 Extension
Agreements superseded and extinguished the 2001 Note. (Id.)
The Trial Court's Basis for Reaffirming its Grant of Summary Judgment

In ruling on the rule 54(b) motion, the trial court recognized that the
McMurdie Parties were "revers[ing] their prior position and request[ing] that the
[trial] [c]ourt enforce the 2003 Note, the 2004 Notes, and the Modification
Agreement" and "assert[ing] that these subsequent agreements were intended to
renew and extend the 2001 Note, thus avoiding the statute of limitations issue."

(R. 3039-40, attached as Addendum H to Br. of Appellants.) The trial court then
acknowledged that as a legal matter a subsequent agreement "may serve to
renew a debt rather than extinguish it" and that whether a subsequent agreement
renews an old one or supersedes it depends on

111

the intent of the parties."' (R.

3040, attached as Addendum H to Br. of Appellant (citation omitted).) The trial
court then stated: "In the present case, we need not puzzle about the intentions

5
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of the parties." (Id.) It then pointed to evidence suggesting that the subsequent
agreements were intended to supersede the 2001 Note; ignored the evidence
suggesting that the subsequent agreements were intended to renew and extend
@

the 2001 Note; and concluded:
Ultimately, reversing ... course [by ratifying the 2003 Note, 2004
Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and 2013 Extension Agreements]
in order to defeat the statute of limitations bar lands the McMurdie
Parties on the horns of a different dilemma.
Based upon the foregoing, there is no basis upon which to
revisit the Summary Judgment Ruling under Rule 54. The Court's
prior ruling was not clearly erroneous and the McMurdie Parties'
motion to revise is properly DENIED.

(R. 3040-41, attached as Addendum H to Br. of Appellant.)
ARGUMENT

I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW FOR CORRECTNESS THE LEGAL
CONCLUSION ON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS DENIAL
OF THE MCMURDIE PARTIES' RULE 54(b) MOTION TO REVISE.

A.

Luke argues, in essence, that the trial court had discretion not
to address the McMurdie Parties' alternative argument based
on ratification of the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension
Agreements, and 2013 Extension Agreements.

In their opening brief, the McMurdie Parties demonstrated that a genuine
issue of fact exists as to whether the 2001 Note was renewed by the 2003 Note,
2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and 2013 Extension Agreements. (Br. of
Appellants 38-47.) The McMurdie parties also demonstrated that this factual
issue is material since the foreclosure sale in this case was within the statute of

6
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~

limitations if the 2001 Note was renewed and outside the limitation period if it
was superseded. (Id. at 34-38, 46-47.) In response, Luke acknowledges that the
McM urdie Parties' rule 54(b) motion raised a new argument based on ratification
of the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and 2013 Extension
Agreements. (See Br. of Appellee 10-11.) And Luke does not dispute that if those
subsequent agreements are ratified, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether the 2001 Note was renewed or superseded. (See id. at 9-12.)
Instead, Luke asserts that in disposing of the rule 54(b) motion, the trial
court never ruled on the McMurdie Parties' argument based on ratification of the
subsequent agreements. (See id. at 9 ("[T]he trial court made no ... holding [that
the 2001 Note was superseded].").) Luke says that the trial court did nothing
more than affirm its prior grant of summary judgment on the ground that the
subsequent agreements are void. (See id. 9-12.) He argues: "This Court should

~

simply affirm the trial court's ruling [that it made on the ground that the
subsequent agreements are void]." (Id. at 12.)
Luke's argument-i.e., that this Court should affirm the trial court's denial
of the rule 54(b) Motion to Revise because the trial court did not rule on the new
argument raised by the McMurdie Parties-implicitly asserts that the trial court
had discretion not to consider the ratification-based statute of limitations
argument that the McMurdie Parties raised for the first time in their rule 54(b)

7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Gw

Motion to Revise. See IHC Health Sen.JS., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, if 32,
196 P.3d 588 (holding that, although the trial court "had discretion to reconsider"
a particular issue in light of a "newly developed ... argument," it also had
~

discretion not to reopen the issue and consider the new argument).
Admittedly, in many cases the '" decision to grant or deny a motion to
reconsider summary judgment is within the discretion of the trial court."' 1
U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 1999 UT App 303, if 57,990 P.2d 945 (citation

omitted). This stems from the "law of the case doctrine," which allows a trial
court to "reconsider [its prior] decision[s]" while a case remains pending before
it, but which also "allows a [trial] court to decline to revisit issues within the
same case once [it] has ruled on them." IHC Health Servs., 2008 UT 73,

,r,r 26-27,

196 P.3d 588. "However, '[w]hen a legal question is presented to an appellate
@

court in law-of-the-case packaging,' the abuse of discretion standard must yield
to the correctness standard of review." In re Adoption of A.F.K., 2009 UT App 198,

,r 15, 216 P.3d 980 (citation omitted). This is such a case.
In their opening brief, the McMurdie Parties cited the standard of review for an
appeal from a grant of summary judgment since this appeal is from a grant and
reaffirmation of summary judgment. (See Br. of Appellants 3-4.) The arguments
in Luke's brief, however, implicitly point up the fact (and the McMurdie Parties
thus hereby acknowledge) that the standard of review for an appeal from denial
of a rule 54(b) motion to reconsider is not always the same as the standard of
review for an appeal from a summary judgment ruling. However, as set forth
herein, in this case a de nova standard of review should apply to the trial court's
denial of the McMurdie Parties' rule 54(b) motion.
1

8
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B.

The trial court made a legal ruling on the McMurdie Parties'
ratification-based statute of limitations argument.

Contrary to Luke's assertion, in disposing of the McMurdie Parties' rule
54(b) motion, the trial court ruled on the McMurdie Parties' ratification-based
statute of limitations argument. Specifically, the trial court correctly observed
that "the McMurdie Parties ... [had] request[ed] that the [c]ourt enforce the 2003
Note, the 2004 Note, and the Modification Agreement" and "assert[ed] that these
subsequent agreements were intended to renew and extend the 2001 Note, thus
avoiding the statute of limitations issue." (R. 3040, attached as Addendum H to
Br. of Appellants.) The trial court then stated that "[w]hether a new agreement
should extend an old agreement or discharge it is governed by 'the general rule
that the intent of the parties should control."' (Id. (citation omitted).)
Having correctly apprehended the McMurdie Parties' new argument and
the governing law, the trial court then said: "[i]n the present case, we need not
puzzle about the intentions of the parties"; "[the 2004 Notes] appear to be new
obligations which super[s]ede and satisfy the 2001 Note"; and "reversing ...
course [by ratifying the subsequent agreements] in order to defeat the statute of
limitations bar lands the McMurdie Parties squarely on the horns of a different
dilemma." (Id.) It then concluded: "Based upon the foregoing, there is no basis
upon which to revisit the Summary Judgment Ruling[.]" (R. 3041, attached as
Addendum H to Br. of Appellants.)
9
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By stating "we need not puzzle about the intentions of the parties"; "[the
2004 Notes] appear to be new obligations which super[s]ede and satisfy the 2001
Note"; "[the McMurdie Parties have] land[ed] ... squarely on the horns of a
t.i

different dilemma" by ratifying the later agreements; and "[b]ased upon the
foregoing, there is no basis to revisit the Summary Judgment Ruling," the trial
court plainly held that, even if the subsequent agreements are ratified, as a
matter of law the 2001 Note was superseded and, thus, the statute of limitations
barred the foreclosure action. As set forth in the McMurdie Parties' opening
brief, that holding is in error at the summary judgment stage since there remains
a material issue of fact as to whether the parties intended the subsequent
agreements to renew or supersede the 2001 Note. (Br. of Appellants 40-47.)
C.

This Court should review the trial court's legal ruling for
correctness.

Again, ordinarily the '" decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider
summary judgment is within the discretion of the trial court."' U.P.C., 1999 UT
Cj

App 303, ,r 57,990 P.2d 945 (citation omitted). However, the Utah Supreme
Court has said that there is "no reason why an erroneous legal determination

@

should be afforded greater discretion on appeal merely because it wears the garb
of law of the case." In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ,r 33, 137 P.3d 809. "For purposes of
review ... , considerations of law of the case must yield to those of the substance of the

underlying ruling when ascertaining the proper standard of review." Id.
10
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(emphasis added). Thus, where the trial court expressly took up the legal issue
raised by the McMurdie Parties in their rule 54(b) motion,2 ruled on that legal

(ii

issue, and gave no reason for denying the motion other than its ruling on that
legal issue, this Court should exercise de novo review of the trial court's legal
ruling. See In re E.H., 2006 UT 36,

,r 33, 137 P.3d 809; In re R.B.F.S., 2012 UT App

132, ,r 8, 278 P.3d 143. To do otherwise would be to give trial courts discretion to
make erroneous legal rulings so long as those erroneous rulings occur in the
context of rule 54(b) motions.
On the other hand, if the trial court had, for example, declined to revisit its

~

grant of summary judgment because it believed the McMurdie Parties waited too
long to raise their alternative argument, this Court would have been justified in

This Court may review for abuse of discretion the trial court's decision to
reopen the statute of limitations issue. See In re R.B.F.S., 2012 UT App 132, ,r 8,
278 P.3d 143 ("Initially, we determine whether the trial judge abused his
discretion in revisiting a matter previously decided by another judge."). But the
legal ruling that followed the trial court's decision to reopen the statute of
limitations issue must be reviewed for correctness. See id. ("We then review the
substance of the second judge's decision, which in this case is an issue of law that
we review for correctness.").
The trial court here did not abuse its discretion by deciding to reopen the
statute of limitations issue where the McMurdie Parties rule 54(b) motion
presented that issue in a different light and provided more adequate briefing of
the statute of limitations issue than had been provided before. See U.P. C., 1999
UT App 303, ,r 58, 990 P.2d 945 (stating that a litigant seeking revision of a
summary judgment ruling under rule 54(b) '"may show that ... the matter is
presented in a "different light" or ... [that] an issue was inadequately briefed
when first contemplated by the court"' (citation omitted)).
2

11
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~

applying an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's decision not to revisit
its summary judgment ruling. See IHC Health Servs., 2008 UT 73,

,r,r 24-37, 196

P.3d 588. In this regard, this case is distinguishable from IHC Health Services.
In IHC Health Services, a tenant failed to make a rental payment, and the
landlord "sued, alleging breach of the [l]ease." Id.

,r,r 4, 6. The tenant's

II

answer
II

invoked ten affirmative defenses, including waiver, [and] estoppel," but it did
not specifically invoke the defense of substantial compliance." Id.

,r 6. The

landlord moved for a declaratory judgment based on the undisputed facts, and
in response the tenant again "raised only waiver and equitable estoppel as
defenses." Id.

,r 7. It "did not raise the doctrine of substantial compliance." Id.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord, and
the tenant appealed. Id.

Id.

,r 8. The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

,r 9. On remand, the landlord filed a summary judgment motion. Id. ,r 10. In

response, the tenant again "argued only waiver ... and did not raise the doctrine
of substantial compliance." Id. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
landlord, who then "moved for a certification of finality under rule 54(b)." Id.

,I 11. In response to the landlord's rule 54(b) motion, the tenant asserted for the
first time "substantial compliance as a defense to forfeiture." Id. "The district
court refused to hear the substantial compliance argument because the claim of
forfeiture had already been decided." Id. The tenant again appealed. Id.

~

12
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"[T]he court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
remitted the case to the district court to resolve the remaining issues in the case,
including attorney fees and damages." Id.

,r 12. "After the remittitur ... , [the

tenant] moved the district court to reconsider the forfeiture claim in light of its
substantial compliance argument." Id. The district court cited the multiple earlier
opportunities the tenant had had to raise the argument of substantial compliance
and then concluded: "[The tenant] 'never timely raised this argument and is
precluded from making it at this late date on the grounds of ... law of the case."'
Id. Then the tenant appealed for the third time. Id.

,r 1.

In that third appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to
address the tenant's newly-raised, substantial compliance argument. Id.

,r 37. The

Supreme Court emphasized how the trial court had "enumerated [the tenant's]
numerous opportunities [before and after the first appeal] to argue substantial
compliance" and how the tenant had repeatedly failed to do so. Id.

,r,r 31-32. The

Supreme Court then concluded that, "[w]hile the district court may have had
discretion to reconsider the issue of forfeiture, the law of the case doctrine
justified its refusal to reopen the issue to consider [the] newly developed
substantial compliance argument." 3 Id.

,r 32.

The Supreme Court noted that trial court in IHC Health Services also said "that
[the tenant] could not prevail on the merits as a matter of law even if it
considered the substantial compliance defense." 2008 UT 73, ,r 32, 196 P.3d 588.
3
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The Supreme Court then observed that there are three circumstances
under which a district court is "require[d] ... to revisit an issue it has already
decided." Id.
~

,r,r 33, 34. But it concluded that none of those circumstances

"appl[ied] to excuse [the tenant's] failure to raise substantial compliance in a
timely manner." Id.

,r,r 25, 35-36.

Unlike the IHC Health Services trial court, which declined to address the
tenant's rule 54(b) argument on the ground that the argument was not timely
raised, the trial court here said nothing about the timeliness of the McMurdie
Parties' ratification-based statute of limitations argument. 4 Rather, the trial court
in this case expressly addressed the ratification-based statute of limitations
argument and made a legal ruling on that argument. (See R. 3038-41, attached as
Addendum H to Br. of Appellants.) Then the trial court denied the McMurdie
@

Parties' rule 54(b) motion based solely on that legal ruling. (See id.) Thus, unlike in

IHC Health Services, where the Supreme Court had to decide whether the trial

To that extent, the IHC Health Services trial court did comment on the merits of
the tenant's new argument. However, the thrust of the trial court's reasoning in
denying the rule 54(b) motion (and the thrust of the Supreme Court's affirmance
of that denial) was clearly the fact that the tenant had failed on numerous prior
occasions to raise the substantial compliance argument. See id. ,r,r 12, 24-33.
The McMurdie Parties first raised their ratification-based statute of limitations
argument in their Answer by denying that the 2001 Note had been superseded.
(See R. 76-77, 190-91.) Moreover, they filed their rule 54(b) motion less than two
weeks after the trial court issued its order granting summary judgment in favor
of Luke. (See R. 2743, 2757-58.)

4
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court was "required ... to reopen the issue of forfeiture," 2008 UT 73, ,r,r 33-35,
196 P.3d 588, here the trial court reopened the statute of limitations issue of its
own volition (see R. 3038-41, attached as Addendum H to Br. of Appellants).
Because the trial court here reopened the statute of limitations issue of its own
volition; ruled on that issue; and then made that ruling the sole basis for denying
the McMurdie Parties' rule 54(b) motion, this Court should distinguish this case
~

from IHC Health Seroices and review the trial court's legal ruling for correctness.

See In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ~ 33, 137 P.3d 809; In re R.B.F.S., 2012 UT App 132, ~ 8,
278 P.3d 143.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO HOLD THAT FACTUAL
ISSUES EXIST AS TO WHETHER LUKE IS ESTOPPED FROM
ASSERTING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

A.

A party asserting equitable estoppel to toll the statute of
limitations need not prove that he was unaware of his claim
prior to the close of the limitation period.

In their opening brief, the McMurdie Parties demonstrated that equitable
estoppel should apply to prevent a party from asserting the statute of limitations
when there is (1) '"" a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party

inconsistent with a claim later asserted""'; (2) '""reasonable action or inaction by
the other party, taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or
failure to act""'; and (3) "'"injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate the statement, admission, act,
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<ii

or failure to act.""' (Br. of Appellants 49 (quoting Baldassin v. Freeman, 2009 UT
App 109U, 2009 WL 1089551, para. 9 (mem.) (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl,
896 P.2d 644,647 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)).) Absent from the elements of equitable
0A

estoppel in this context is a requirement that the party asserting it must prove
that he did not learn of his claim within the limitation period. 5
This was made especially apparent in Rice v. Granite School District, 456
P.2d 159 (Utah 1969). In Rice, the plaintiff alleged that she was injured when she
attended a football game and "fell from a bleacher, which was negligently
maintained by [the] defendant." Id. at 160. The defendant's insurance carrier
"admitted liability and promised compensation" and then "led [the plaintiff] to
believe that the only unresolved issue was the ascertainment of her damages,
which she was informed was contingent solely on her discharge by her doctor."

@

Id. at 163. After the statute of limitations passed, however, the insurance
company denied the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 161.
The Utah Supreme Court concluded that, based on those facts, "a trier of
fact could reasonably conclude that the conduct of the adjuster was such as to
induce [the] plaintiff to delay filing her action" until after the applicable

In fact, Judge Thorne has observed that in the statute of limitations context,
equitable estoppel may require an even "less formal, inducement-based analysis"
than the three-part test used in Kearl and relied on in Baldassin. See Baldassin, 2009
UT App 109U, 2009 WL 1089551 at *4 (Thorne, J., concurring and dissenting).

5
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limitation period. Id. at 163. The Supreme Court held that "[w]here the delay in
commencing an action is induced by the conduct of the defendant, or his privies
... , it cannot be availed of by any of them as a defense." Id. The Supreme Court
then remanded the case for trial. Id.
Notably, the Rice plaintiff was aware of her claim within the limitations
period. See id. at 160. Yet the arguably deceitful nature of the insurance adjuster's
conduct was sufficient to create a factual issue on equitable estoppel because the
plaintiff's delay in commencing her action was arguably induced by that
conduct. Id. at 163. Similarly here, the McMurdie Parties were aware of their
foreclosure claim within the limitations period. Yet, as set forth in their opening
brief, the admittedly deceitful nature of Zane's conduct is sufficient to create a
factual issue on equitable estoppel because the McMurdie Parties' delay in
commencing their foreclosure action was arguably induced by Zane's deceitful
conduct. (Br. of Appellants 49-53.)
Luke nevertheless insists that to assert equitable estoppel in this context
the McMurdie Parties must meet what he calls the "Threshold Requirement,"
which is to '''first show that '[they] did not know and could not reasonably have
discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an
action within that period."' (Br. of Appellee 13.) However, Luke misapprehends
the relationship between equitable estoppel and the discovery rule. He contends
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that "equitable estoppel ... is a part of the equitable discovery rule" and,
therefore, that the discovery rule's Threshold Requirement applies to the
supposed sub-category of equitable estoppel. (Id. at 12-13.) But Luke has it
@

backwards-the discovery rule is a sub-category of equitable estoppel. See

Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ,r 26, 108 P.3d 741 (stating that
"the discovery rule" has its "genesis in estoppel"); Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838
P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Utah 1992) ("[T]he discovery rule is essentially a claim of
equitable estoppel[.]"). And, as demonstrated in both Rice and Baldassin, while
the discovery rule may include the Threshold Requirement that Luke relies on,
equitable estoppel generally does not.
Admittedly, in Beaver CounhJ v. ProperhJ Tax Division of Utah State Tax

Commission, 2006 UT 6, 128 P.3d 1187, the Utah Supreme Court said: "We have
yet to hear a case in which a litigant was aware of his or her claims within the
statutory time frame and nonetheless merited equitable tolling." Id.

,r 32. But that

statement must be viewed in context.
In Beaver CounhJ, the Property Tax Division (the "Division") learned in July
of 2000 that PacifiCorp had erroneously overstated certain deductions in its 1997
@

report. Id.

,r 5. "There was no allegation offraud on the part of PacifiCorp in the

misreporting. All parties concede[d] that the mistakes were made in good
faith[.]" Id.

Gj

,r 5 n.1 (emphasis added).
18
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By statute, the Division had five years from its initial 1997 tax assessment
to issue a new assessment based on the newly discovered information. Id.

,r,r 19-

Gi,i

24. Yet the Division waited until August 29, 2002, to issue a new assessment for
1997. Id.

,r 24. PacifiCorp thus challenged the new assessment on the ground that

it was issued after the five-year limitation period. Id.

~

,r 11. Some counties (the

"Counties") were allowed to intervene in the action since they would benefit
from the potential additional tax revenue. Id.

,r 24.

The State Tax Commission "conceded that had the suit been between
PacifiCorp and the Division alone, it would have found the [new] assessment ...
to be untimely." Id.

,r 24. But it decided "to equitably toll the limitations period in

the interests of the intervening Counties" since the Counties had timely and
repeatedly urged the Division to issue a new assessment and, the Commission
believed, they should not be penalized for the Division's delay. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and refused to allow "equitable tolling"
because "[n]ot only were the Counties unable to show that the Division was
prevented from issuing a timely [new] assessment due to an excusable delay in
discovering the underlying claim, but they were likewise unable to demonstrate
that applying the limitations period would be irrational or unjust." Id.

,r 28. In

that context, where no fraudulent inducement caused the Division to forego
issuing a new assessment within the limitations period, the court said that it had
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~

"yet to hear a case in which a litigant was aware of his or her claims within the
statutory time frame and nonetheless merited equitable tolling." Id.

,r 32.

Plainly, the Beaver CounhJ court was not referring to cases where a
@

defendant fraudulently induces a plaintiff to forego filing a known claim within
the limitation period. Indeed, less than a year before issuing Beaver CounhJ, the
Supreme Court said: "'[T]o permit one practicing a fraud and then concealing it
to plead the statute of limitations when, in fact, the injured party did not know of
and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud' would be
'not only subversive of good morals, but also contrary to the plainest principles
of justice."' Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, if 28, 108 P.3d 741 (citation omitted).
Moreover, prior to Beaver County the Utah Supreme Court had seen cases in
which the plaintiff had been fraudulently induced to delay bringing a known

@

claim and the court applied equitable estoppel to toll the statute of limitations.

See Rice, 456 P.2d at 163 (permitting tolling where the plaintiff was aware of her
personal injury claim within the statutory limitation period); Anderson v. Cercone,
180 P. 586, 587-90 (Utah 1919) (permitting tolling where the plaintiff was aware
of his claim for recovery of real property within the statutory period). 6 And three

In Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285, 287-88 (Utah 1997), and Dansie v. Anderson Lumber
Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the Utah Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals, respectively, cited approvingly the rule from Rice but distinguished
those cases from Rice on their facts.

6
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years after the Beaver CounhJ decision, this Court acknowledged that a medical
malpractice plaintiff who was aware of his claim within the limitation period
could assert equitable estoppel to toll the statute of limitations, although the
Court held that the plaintiff ultimately was unable to prove the elements of
equitable estoppel. See Baldassin, 2009 UT App 1090, 2009 WL 1089551.
Because this Court and the Supreme Court have recognized that equitable
estoppel may toll the statute of limitations when a defendant fraudulently
induces a plaintiff to delay bringing a known claim within the limitations period,
Luke's Threshold Requirement argument is a misplaced response to the
McMurdie Parties' equitable estoppel argument.

B.

There is a factual issue as to whether Zane was Luke's privy.

In their opening brief, the McMurdie Parties showed that "'[t]he term
"privity" is defined as a mutual or successive relationship to the same right or
property."' (Br. of Appellants 53 (quoting Glenn Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena

Mining Co., 296 P. 231,233 (Utah 1931)).) They then asserted that where Luke is
Zane's grantee of the Alpine Property under a quitclaim deed that conveyed only
the interest of Zane, Zane is a privy of Luke. (Id.)

The McMurdie Parties cited Varoz v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435 (Utah 1973), in
their opening brief as an additional case that cited approvingly the estoppel rule
from Rice. (Br. of Appellants 48.) They have since discovered that the relevant
language from Varoz is contained in Justice Ellett' s dissent, not in the majority
opinion. See Varoz, 506 P.2d at 437 (Ellett, J., dissenting).
21
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~

In response, Luke relies on Roger P. Christensen IRA v. American Heritage

Title Agency, Inc., 2016 UT App 36, il 30, 368 P.3d 125, cert. denied, 379 P.3d 1184
(Utah 2016), to argue that "[t]he mere fact that a new owner succeeded to the
~

ownership of the property [is] not sufficient to impute the fraudulent conduct of
a prior owner to the new owner for purposes of [equitable estoppel] ." (Br. of
Appellee 21.)
In some ways, the facts of Roger P. Christensen are similar to the facts of this
case. The plaintiff in Roger P. Christensen made three loans to a Mr. Lancaster "for
the purpose of investing in real estate." 2016 UT App 36, ,r 2,368 P.3d 125. "Each
loan was secured by a trust deed on a property [owned by Lancaster or his
company.]" Id. Lancaster defaulted on the loans and then transferred to third
parties the properties that secured the loans. Id.

ilil 4-6. Due to "concealment and

misleading" on the part of Lancaster, the plaintiff did not seek to foreclose on the
trust deeds until after the limitations period had passed. See id.

il 26. When the

plaintiff asserted equitable estoppel to toll the statute of limitations, this Court
held that equitable estoppel could not apply because there were "no allegations
that the foreclosure defendants were involved in [Lancaster's] fraudulent
conduct or committed any wrongdoing." Id.

,r 30.

Roger P. Christensen is also distinguishable from the McMurdie Parties'
case in two important ways. First, when Lancaster transferred the properties that
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secured the Roger P. Chritensen plaintiff's loans, for two of them at least he gave
warranty deeds, suggesting that the grantees were bona fide purchasers for
value. See id.

,r,r 4-6. In contrast, Zane transferred the Alpine Property via

quitclaim deed and for no consideration to his minor son, Luke, who was then

<ft;

serving an LDS mission. (R. 1311, 2243-44.)
Second, while the foreclosure defendants in Roger P. Christensen were not
alleged to have been involved in Lancaster's fraud or wrongdoing, here Luke
testified as follows:
Q.

So the fact that your father was criminally charged in 2005 is
not something that was hidden from the family.

A.

No.

Q.

Okay. Everybody in the family knows about it.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. And they know what it was about.

A.

Yes.

(R. 2271.)
Q.

Okay. Who - who - who asked you if they could title the
Alpine property in your name?

A.

It was Zane.

Q.

Your dad.

A.

Yes.

(R. 2243.)

GFv
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Q.

Okay. Have you ever seen the property in Alpine that we're
here on today?

A.

I've never been up to it, no.

Q.

Okay. Do you know approximately where this property is?

A.

No, I do not.

Q.

Tell me what you know about the Alpine property, Mr.
Jeppesen.

A.

I don't know much. It's 5 acres up on a hill, and that's about
really all I know.

@

~

~

(R. 2242-43.)
@

@

Q.

Okay. So you are aware that you have sued Harry
McMurdie's IRA over the Alpine property.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. But why are you suing Harry McMurdie's IRA?

A.

For my dad's sake.

Q.

Okay. Well, tell me about that. What['s] your dad's stake in
this thing?

A.

[My dad] claims it's his property, and so ...

<@

@

(R. 2248 (emphasis added).)

Q.

What are you seeking to accomplish by suing Harry
McMurdie's IRA?

A.

Property.

Q.

Okay. And why should you have this property?

A.

Because I believe that it's - it's ours.

@

~
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~

(R. 2250 (emphasis added).)
Q.

... [W]hen you filed your first Complaint in this case,
something happened to get a lawsuit going.

A.

(Nods head.)

Q.

So tell me how that happened.

A.

I - I can't remember. I - I don't know.

Q.

Okay. So you didn't go down to Mr. Booth's office, did you?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay. So your father made the arrangements to get the
lawsuit started.

A.

Could have.

Q.

It wasn't you who made the arrangements to get the lawsuit

started.
~

A.

No.

(R. 2308-09.)
Q.

[And] you can't explain to me anything about any of the
strategy or any reasons why anything was done, can you?

A.

Not off the top of my head, no.

(R. 2311.)
In the claim preclusion context, "'[t]he legal definition of a person in
privity with another, is a person so identified in interest with another that he
represents the same legal right."' Press Publ'g, Ltd. v. Matol Botanical Int'l, Ltd.,
2001 UT 106, ,r 20, 37 P.3d 1121 (citation omitted). Black's Law Dictionary has
similarly defined "privy" generally to mean "[o]ne who is a partaker or has any
25
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part or interest in any action, matter, or thing." Black's La,v Dictionary 833
(abridged 6th ed. 1991). Given Luke's testimony that he has long known that his
father, Zane, was charged with securities fraud; that Luke agreed to take the
@

Alpine Property via quitclaim deed but otherwise knows virtually nothing about
the property; that Luke is engaged in this litigation for Zane's sake because Zane
claims the Alpine Property is his and because Luke believes it is theirs; and that
Luke can explain nothing else about the litigation, there is at least a factual issue
as to whether Zane has a part or interest in this action and is, thus, Luke's privy.
There were no similar facts in Roger P. Christensen.
C.

The privity issue was preserved for review.

Finally, Luke argues that the privity issue was not preserved for review.
(Br. of Appellee 16-18.) However, the McMurdie Parties argued below that,
based on Zane's fraudulent conduct, Luke should be estopped from asserting the
statute of limitations. (R. 1690-95.) Inherent in that argument is the assertion that
Luke is in privity with Zane. Moreover, the McMurdie Parties relied on the same
evidence quoted above to argue to the trial court that Luke was Zane's agent
when it came to Luke's dealings with the Alpine Property. (R. 2643-57.) And they
made that argument for the purpose of defeating Luke's Motion for Summary
Judgment on Quiet Title Claims. (See R. 2656-57; 2659-62; 2700-02.) Moreover,
Luke himself raised the privity issue in the trial court when he argued:
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The McMurdie IRA argues that Zane's fraud prevented it from
becoming aware of its lien foreclosure claims in time to enforce
them. However ... , the fraud or concealment must have been
perpetrated by "the defendant" - in other words, the party seeking
to benefit from the statute of limitations ....
The McMurdie IRA has not asserted any concealment or
wrongdoing by Luke which prevented them from foreclosing the
2001 Trust Deeds in a timely manner. The McMurdie IRA claims "a
14-year long promissory-note investment scam perpetuated by Zane
Jeppesen and furthered with the assistance from his son, Luke
Jeppesen, in 2015." [This allegation is] entirely unsupported by the
record ....

(R. 1973 (footnotes and record citations omitted).)
For an issue to be preserved for review, the "' trial court must [simply] be
offered an opportunity to rule on [it]."' O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46,

,r 18,217 P.3d

704 (citation omitted). As demonstrated, the trial court was given an opportunity
to rule on the privity issue. Thus, this issue was preserved. See id.
CONCLUSION
~

This Court should review for correctness the trial court's erroneous
ruling-in the face of disputed facts-that as a matter of law the 2001 Note was
superseded by the ratified 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements,
and 2013 Extension Agreements. Alternatively, if those subsequent agreements
are voided instead of ratified, this Court should conclude that there is a
preserved factual issue as to whether Luke should be estopped from asserting
the statute of limitations because of Zane's fraudulent conduct.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

JiL1ay of September 2017.

PECK HADFIELD BAXTER & MOORE, LLC
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Attorneys for Appellants

~
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